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Contemporary Turkey: 
A Country of Tense Coexistence
Fatma Muge Gocek
I. Introduction
The most significant characteristic that distinguishes Turkey today 
is the tense coexistence of the East and the West within. This is evident 
in its political structure, in which a popularly elected Islamist govern-
ment is in power within the only secular state in the world with a Mus-
lim population ratio of 99%. It is visible in the arena of personal rights, 
where even though the Constitution guarantees the right to education 
for all of its citizens, women wearing the Islamic headscarf are banned 
from getting a public education. And it is revealed in its spatial poli-
tics, since women dressed in miniskirts are just as likely to be expelled 
from Islamist coffeehouses as those in Islamic attire are asked to leave 
Western-style discotheques. It is critical to understand the dynamics of 
this schizophrenic coexistence, in which one segment of society defines 
itself as the epitome of modernization, civilization, and the West, while 
another segment, which appears more religiously oriented and cogni-
zant of the East, has become even more vocal in the post-September 
11 world, especially in the recent context of the war being fought to 
“bring democracy to Islam.” Since contemporary Turkey has spent a 
long time negotiating the uneasy relationship between Islam and poli-
tics, this essay analyzes the dynamics of this relationship through the 
history of republican Turkey.
Scholars who specialize in the Middle East have studied this prob-
lematique in depth, but they do so by highlighting the structural and 
institutional conditions necessary to bring about a truly participatory 
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political system.1 What is frequently overlooked is the spectrum of 
societal meanings of these concepts across time and space. This essay 
argues that it is specifically this spectrum that determines a particular 
political outcome. Therefore, it focuses on the formation and trans-
formation of meanings around the particular East-West dynamics in 
contemporary Turkey. Doing so identifies Turkey’s major social actors 
and institutions from the moment of their arrival in the Middle East as 
well as the meanings these actors and institutions create as they live 
through history.
Since the personal is political and objectivity is an often imaginary 
reality, one could argue that the tense coexistence of the East and West 
is the focus of this essay because of my particular life story. As a Turk-
ish citizen who spent the first twenty-five years of her life in Turkey 
to then become an American citizen living in the United States for 
the next twenty-two years, my life itself has been a microcosm of the 
struggle between two societies that are so different yet also similar. 
This personal factor extends into the professional as I research how 
the East and West were constructed as concepts throughout history, 
and how non-Western societies in general and Turkey in particular 
negotiated these concepts. It has also become evident how much the 
post-September 11 world context has shaped the particular perspective 
through which I approach contemporary Turkey, given my attempts to 
make sense of why so much terror and suffering have been inflicted in 
the name of, and, at the same time, in opposition to Islam. Hence, my 
hope is that this essay will illuminate the social dynamics of Turkish 
society and reveal the complexity of the relationship between Islam 
and democracy, thus reevaluating the efficacy of the agenda that the 
United States government is actively promoting in Iraq.
Let me start with a disclaimer: even though the main question of 
the essay is posed in terms of an East-West tension, my intention is to 
demonstrate that what currently exists is not, as some scholars claim, a 
“clash of civilizations,”2 but rather a coalescence of them. The analysis 
of contemporary Turkey demonstrates how different elements from 
the East and West merge into a complex mosaic, one whose pattern 
must be urgently identified in order to allay the world conflict we 
are currently enmeshed in. The origins of the shape, style, and con-
tent of that mosaic, this essay argues, can be traced to the European 
Enlightenment and the modernity project it infused in the rest of the 
world.3 The negotiation of this fusion created certain dynamics in all 
non-Western societies in general, and in predominantly Islamic ones in 
Fatma Muge Gocek
5
particular.4 Turkey, as one such country, commenced this negotiation 
in the 18th century, while still an empire. After the Ottoman Empire 
slowly dissolved while struggling with the forces of modernity during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Turkish nation-state continued 
the struggle into the 21st century.
II. Historical Antecedents of the Turkish Republic: 
The Emergence and Rise of the Ottoman Empire
The history of the Turkish Republic in Anatolia can be traced back 
to the 10th and 11th centuries, when the adverse climatic conditions 
in Central Asia led to the initial westward migration of Turcoman 
tribes into the Fertile Crescent. The settled urban Islamic empires of 
the region needed to contain this volatile population and employed 
some of the tribesmen as mercenaries, gradually directing the rest 
away from the urban centers toward their northern frontiers with the 
Byzantine Empire. During the process of migration, these nomadic 
tribes adopted Islam, replacing their shamanistic religions. It should 
be noted that this somewhat late conversion of the Turks to Islam was 
to become a significant factor that Arab communities in the region 
employed whenever they wanted to delegitimate the eventual Turkish 
rule that was established over their lands.
The organized raids carried out by these nomadic tribes into the 
Anatolian territories of the weakening Byzantine Empire eventu-
ally led to the formation of many Turkic principalities at the expense 
of the Byzantines. The principality closest to the Byzantine Empire, 
which was established circa 1299 in Nicea, was to eventually transform 
into the dynasty of the house of Osman, later known as the Ottoman 
Empire. This particular principality came into being as the Turks first 
gained a foothold in the region by serving as mercenaries to the Byzan-
tine emperor, and then forming strategic alliances with the local Byz-
antine potentates against him. The 14th and 15th centuries witnessed 
their expansion at the expense of both the other Turkish principalities 
and the Byzantine Empire.5
The Ottoman mode of expansion was always westward. Even 
though this was initially because of their choice of conducting con-
quests against the infidel Byzantines instead of the other Turkish Mus-
lim principalities, it eventually became symbolically affixed as the 
Ottomans continued to define their identity in relation to Europe. The 
location of the imperial capitals demonstrates this choice: the capitals 
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moved westward from Nicea, Bursa, Adrianople (Edirne) in the Bal-
kans. After having surrounded the Byzantine Empire from both the 
east and the west, the Ottomans eliminated the Byzantine Empire with 
the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, which they immediately made 
their own capital until their demise in 1922. Their westward orienta-
tion would later bring the criticism—one that they themselves would 
occasionally agree with or take issue with—that they were never truly 
Islamic in character. It is interesting to note in this context that through 
the 600-year rule of the Ottoman dynasty, none of the Ottoman sultans 
ever undertook the Islamic obligation defined as one of the five pillars 
of Islam. Not one Ottoman sultan conducted a pilgrimage to the Holy 
Lands of Mecca and Medina, even though they were a part of the Otto-
man imperial territories for many centuries.6
Yet the structure of rule established in the Ottoman Empire natural-
ized the superiority of Muslims in society.7 Only the Muslims could 
bear arms, rise politically to the ranks of the ruling elite, and pass these 
privileges on to their offspring. Still, the Ottoman Empire granted 
many social, economic, and political privileges to the non-Muslims 
living amongst them, privileges that were particularly significant at a 
time when such religious minorities were being persecuted through-
out Europe. The Ottoman administration was able to do so through 
the establishment of the Millet system, whereby the imperially desig-
nated Ottoman minorities of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews were given 
rights to self-govern in return for paying a special poll tax (cizye). The 
tax was levied in return for military protection, and legal responsi-
bility devolved to the communal leaders for the actions of their par-
ticular communities.8 Fully integrated into the empire economically, 
they could hold significant administrative posts, especially as they 
pertained to finance. Yet, unlike the Muslims, their political privileges 
were restricted to their persons because their social contact with the 
Muslim society at large was carefully regulated. Not only did the Otto-
man minorities wear specific attire that visibly marked them as non-
Muslim, but they could not pass their political privileges on to their 
children. The latter was due to the fact that marriage and therefore 
inheritance across the non-Muslim/Muslim divide was strictly forbid-
den. Only through converting to Islam and thereby giving up all their 
communal ties were these minorities allowed to fully integrate into 
Ottoman Muslim society at large. Still, the presence of this West in 
their own society endowed the Ottoman Empire with a vigor that led 
to their rapid expansion in the 15th and 16th centuries.
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The eastward expansion of the Empire fully commenced in the 16th 
century, mostly at the expense of the Persian Empire, the Mamluks 
of Egypt, and other local Islamic states. The Ottoman defeat of the 
Mamluks in 1520 was particularly significant in that the Ottoman sul-
tans captured and brought to Constantinople the symbolic post of 
the Islamic Caliphate, which had been held by the Egyptian rulers. In 
doing so, the Ottoman Empire attained the symbolic leadership of the 
Muslim world, a post held until 1924, when the newly formed Turkish 
Republic abolished the Caliphate. (It is interesting to note at this junc-
ture that in the message transmitted by Al-Jazeera television, Osama 
bin Laden traces the start of the demise of the Muslim world at the 
hands of the West to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the 
abolition of the Caliphate.)
III. The Onset of the Ottoman Retraction and 
Increased Interaction with the West
The Ottoman state established an empire, the boundaries of which 
extended at its height from the gates of Vienna in the West, to the 
Arabian Peninsula in the East, to the shores of North Africa in the 
Southwest. Scholars trace the commencement of the period of impe-
rial retraction to the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1699.9 Indeed, the 
Ottoman Empire was able to expand until it encountered similar impe-
rial powers. The emerging Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires 
in the West and the Persian Empire in the East delimited the Ottoman 
borders. The 18th century was the period when the Ottoman state, 
cognizant of the European Enlightenment and the subsequent politi-
cal, economic, and military transformations there, became interested in 
reforming the Empire along Western lines.10
It was at this juncture that they sent the first Ottoman ambassador 
to the court of Louis XV with the intent “to observe Western civili-
zation and report on what could be learned and applied from it.” I 
studied this encounter in depth in my first book, East Encounters West: 
France and the Ottoman Empire in the 18th Century.11 While the impact 
of this encounter in France was limited to the appearance of a brief 
fashion of “Turquerie” in the French court, in the Ottoman Empire it led 
to the eventual transformation of the entire social structure. Because 
military victories produced and sustained empires, the first institu-
tion the Ottoman state set out to “modernize” (a term that eventually 
became synonymous with “Westernize”) was the military. In order 
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to maintain a well-drilled standing army in the European manner, it 
became necessary for the Ottoman administration to not only change 
military recruitment (which in turn was connected to the existing tax 
and land revenue systems that also had to be reformed), but also to 
create military academies to educate the recruits, a special treasury 
to pay them, and modern hospitals to heal them. These Western-style 
institutions also came embedded with certain new ideas: the concep-
tions of liberty, equality, and fraternity of the French Revolution were 
the most significant.12 The new societal contract implied in these ideas 
was addressed not to imperial subjects but to potential citizens. These 
citizens had to have equal rights and responsibilities regardless of their 
religion and other communal identities. Their loyalty was not to be 
directed to an omnipotent sultan, but instead to the abstract notion of 
a state that respected their rights. It was, therefore, not surprising that 
once the Ottoman state introduced these Western-style institutions, 
the Ottoman military students who received this education gradually 
started to aspire to the equality of all Ottoman subjects and to profess 
loyalty not to the person of the sultan, as they had formerly done, but 
instead to the idea of an Ottoman constitutional state that would rep-
resent them all.13
This new social contract required individuals to construct their 
political and social identity as citizens. The first step in the transition 
from imperial subjecthood to citizenship commenced with attempts 
to formulate an Ottoman Constitution, initially during the period of 
reform referred to as the Tanzimat Period. The efforts to formulate an 
Ottoman Assembly followed soon after, in 1856. Not surprisingly, it 
was the Ottoman military cadre, now educated in Western-style mili-
tary academies, that spearheaded the reform movement and, in the 
process, became more and more involved in politics.14 Yet there was 
another significant social group that was affected by the European 
ideas of education and political representation: the religious minori-
ties of Jews, Greeks, and Armenians. They likewise started to insist on 
political equality and full access to the Ottoman administration.15 Yet 
among the two groups, the military had a much more central location 
and more power within the state. When the sultan failed to promul-
gate the necessary reforms, it was the young Westernized military cad-
res that intervened in 1908 to replace him and to establish an Ottoman 
Parliament. From that point onward, the state and the sultan (who 
used to represent the state in his person) had to share political power 
with the military.
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The burgeoning political identity of the Westernized military and 
the religious minorities developed in similar yet ultimately different 
directions. While both groups attempted to sustain the concept of a 
multicultural Ottoman identity, the increasing European presence in 
the domestic affairs of the Empire, as well as the search of both groups 
for an identity from within their own pasts (which had developed 
differently because of the dynamics of the Millet system), led them 
to come up with disparate solutions. In the volume I edited entitled 
Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East, I studied the emer-
gence of these disparate solutions by comparatively analyzing the 
Greek, Armenian, Turkish, and Arab nationalisms within the Ottoman 
Empire.16 Even though the dynamics in each one was the same, each 
nevertheless imagined their own to be unique. Because the Turkish 
Muslims formed the ruling element of the Empire, it was eventually 
Turkish nationalism that prevailed at the expense of all the others. 
Even though the ruling elite attempted to hold on to a unifying Otto-
man identity that would have sustained the Empire, the 1908 war in 
Tripoli against the Italians, the 1910–1912 Balkan wars, and eventually 
World War I polarized national identities to the point of no return.
The Balkan wars were especially significant in this polarization. 
When the Ottomans were defeated by the Balkan powers, hundreds of 
thousands of Muslim Turks (who had been living in the Balkans since 
the 14th century) had to flee to the Ottoman capital to avoid being mas-
sacred. They were eventually settled in the central lands of the Empire, 
namely in Anatolia. Yet these Anatolian lands were the location of the 
emerging Greek and Armenian nationalisms as well. With the surge of 
incoming Muslim Turks, the Ottoman state—now under the sway of 
Turkish nationalism—eliminated the local Greek, Armenian, and Arab 
populations to replace them with their ethnic coreligionists.17
IV. Toward the Demise of the Ottoman Empire
In my book entitled Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman 
Westernization and Europe, I tried to comprehend how and why, from 
the 18th century onward, the dynamics of Ottoman Westernization 
were not able to preserve the Empire.18 The European Enlightenment 
had advantaged the bourgeoisie in spearheading social transforma-
tions throughout Europe. What distinguished the burgeoning Otto-
man bourgeoisie from the European one, however, was its multi-ethnic 
character. Therefore, unlike the European bourgeoisie, it could not pool 
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its social, economic, and political resources across the Millet divide to 
transform the Empire. The newly forming Turkish bourgeoisie elimi-
nated its Greek, Armenian, and Jewish components in the name of 
nationalism and, by doing so, destroyed the only chance it had of pre-
serving the Empire.
This process of elimination occurred as follows.19 On the eve of 
World War I, the Ottoman Empire was ruled by the Committee of 
Union and Progress, which was comprised of Westernized mid-level 
mostly Turkish Muslim military officials and politicians. The leaders 
of the Committee were without exception Muslim Turks of Balkan 
origin who no longer had a home to which to return. In addition to 
their ensuing fervent Turkish nationalism, these men had received an 
Enlightenment education. This led them to legitimate their group in the 
name of progress and the secularism of science, and thus marginalize 
the former legitimating ideology of religion. Hence, nationalism and 
science became the two guiding principles of the new conception of 
rule. It was at this juncture that the Ottoman Empire joined World War 
I on the side of the German, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian Empires. 
During the war, nationalism took further root. The English and French 
states that often intervened in the domestic affairs of the Empire in the 
name of protecting the Ottoman minorities were now the enemy.20 The 
Ottomans engaged in an unchecked process of ethnic cleansing that 
reduced the numbers of Greeks and Armenians in the Empire.21 The 
Armenians were especially hard hit in this process because, unlike the 
Greeks, they did not have a homeland to which to return. Prejudice 
fostered by the social divide of the Millet system rapidly turned into 
aggression; the Balkan defeats and the consequent massacre of Mus-
lims further worsened existing relations between the ruling Muslim 
Turks and the Ottoman minorities.
The financial success of the minority bourgeoisie, who did not serve 
in the military and instead served as middlemen in the growing trade 
relations with Europe, increased significantly.22 This accumulation of 
wealth was looked upon unfavorably by the Muslims, especially by 
those who had fled from the Balkans as well as those whose male fam-
ily members had been serving in the Ottoman military for almost a 
decade. The wealth was at first frowned upon, and then sanctioned. 
The minorities were deported or forced to flee and their confiscated 
property and goods were distributed among the Muslim Turks, who 
set about establishing a national Turkish bourgeoisie at all costs. The 
1915 deportation and massacres committed against the Armenians, 
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the deportation of Greeks, and later the migration of the Jews to Pal-
estine all rapidly altered the composition of the Ottoman population. 
The Muslim Turks of the Balkans were settled in where the Ottoman 
minorities were divided. Hence, the multi-hued fabric of the Ottoman 
Empire transformed into the solid color of a nation-state.23
V. The Formation of the Turkish Republic
After the Ottoman Empire lost World War I with devastatingly large 
numbers of casualties, it was an Ottoman general from the now lost 
Ottoman Balkan city of Salonica who was chosen by the now defunct 
Committee of Union and Progress to lead a war of independence 
against the occupying Allied Forces. Mustafa Kemal was a very able 
general who united the Turks and successfully led them in “throwing 
the occupying forces out” of what Turks considered to be their home-
land.24 True to his Westernized education, Mustafa Kemal first formu-
lated a National Assembly in Ankara, away from the former capital 
Constantinople (also known as Istanbul), which was still occupied by 
the Ottoman sultan and the Allied Forces. As the Allied Forces tried to 
bring the perpetrators of the massacres against the Ottoman minorities 
to justice in Istanbul—and deported the prominent Ottoman statesmen 
responsible to the island of Malta—many who were not apprehended 
escaped to Ankara to join forces with Mustafa Kemal.25 The Turkish 
Nationalists thus fought yet another war during 1919–1922, ultimately 
forcing the Allied Forces to withdraw from the central lands of the 
Empire. It was at this juncture that the conflict with Greece reached its 
pinnacle: the British had allowed the Greeks to invade Asia Minor to 
reclaim Western Anatolia as their own. The Turks thus fought a war 
of independence mainly against these Greek forces. The islands of the 
Aegean quickly became points of contention between the two countries 
as each laid down their claims. And thus began the fractious relation-
ship between Greece and Turkey that still continues today.
The former lands of the Empire left outside the boundaries of the 
new Turkish state were also fraught with problems. In the Balkans, the 
Serbs, Albanians, Greeks, and Bulgarians further negotiated their terri-
torial boundaries through conflicts that have continued until the pres-
ent. In the East, the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire became 
the French and British protectorates of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, 
the Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The Kurds became divided across 
three countries: while some remained in Turkey, others were within 
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the lands of the new states of Iraq and Syria. It was the British division 
of these provinces that was to cause so much continued havoc in the 
Middle East because the provinces were portioned out in accordance 
with natural boundaries, such as rivers, rather than by the ethnic and 
communal identities of the peoples residing in them. Syria has never 
given up its claims on Lebanon, for example. The Iraqi leader Sad-
dam Hussein initially invaded Kuwait because he claimed those lands 
should have belonged to Iraq in the first place. Cyprus, which was 
occupied by the British, contained Greek and Turkish communities 
that have coexisted uneasily since then. Hence, one could claim that all 
the current areas of conflict in the Middle East came into being through 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.
Turkish identity became the unifying force of the newly founded 
Republic of Turkey. The only institution that managed to survive the 
transition from empire to new nation-state semi-intact was the mili-
tary, which then formed, with the help of the bureaucratic administra-
tion, the backbone of the new republic after the War of Independence. 
Mustafa Kemal exchanged his military costume with the civilian suit 
of a statesman and set out to construct the new republic. His fifteen-
year rule, from 1923 until his death in 1938, was marked by a series 
of radical reforms that made Turkey a secular republic, its face turned 
unswervingly to Europe with the intent to “join the ranks of the civi-
lized nations of the West.”26 The legal system was one of the first to be 
reformed. A multi-tiered legal system had employed Western laws for 
legal matters concerning the Westerners in the Empire, Islamic laws of 
the sharia for matters pertaining to the Muslims, and laws promulgated 
by the sultan (kanun) when there was no legal precedent. It was now 
replaced by a new unified secular amalgam of laws borrowed from 
countries that seemed “most similar to Turkey in character,” namely, 
commercial laws from Italy, civic laws from France, and personal laws 
from Switzerland.
The second most important reform was the unification of the edu-
cational system. The traditional Islamic education that existed side 
by side with the new Western-style education, complemented by the 
minority and missionary education for the Ottoman minorities and 
European foreigners, were united into one centralized unit. The his-
tory of the Turkish Republic was narrated in the textbooks along the 
lines that Mustafa Kemal had delivered in a six-day-long lecture.27 
Religion as a subject was removed from all schools except at the uni-
versity level where it was taught as an academic subject, and then was 
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offered solely to those specializing in religion. (It should be noted that 
this lack of proper religious education probably accounts for some of 
the quandaries faced by contemporary Turkey in comprehending the 
boundaries and implications of governance by a party that defines 
itself as having a strong Islamic component.) All the knowledge thus 
conveyed through the educational system was carefully crafted along 
nationalist lines that created a distant historical past for Turkey that 
went beyond the Ottoman Empire to the imagined lands of Central 
Asia. The language was purified of “foreign” influences as new words 
of Turkic origin were constructed.28
These significant structural reforms enabled the new republican 
state to control the production and regulation of knowledge through 
education, and social behavior through law. They were complemented 
by a series of reforms defining Turkey’s cultural and political location 
in the world. The alphabet reform replaced Arabic script with the Latin 
one, thereby effectively severing the epistemological ties of the Turks 
with their Ottoman past. This reform was complemented with the cal-
endar reform whereby the Muslim use of Friday as the day of rest was 
replaced by Sunday in order to be more like the “civilized” countries 
of the West. The lunar calendar was superceded by the Roman one, 
and the traditional time keeping was replaced by the European one.
The French Jacobin separation of church and state was also adopted 
in toto, effectively removing religion from the public space into the 
private.29 Gone were the religious foundations, sects, and orders. All 
religion in the public sphere was overseen by the newly established 
Republican Office of Religious Affairs. Marriages, divorces, and all 
legal arrangements concerning family life were no longer based on 
Islamic law but instead on civic laws adopted from the West. Gone, 
too, was the religious attire of the sheikhs and other religious leaders; 
it could only be worn within the confines of religious institutions. And 
the attire of the new republican citizen was likewise reformed. Mustafa 
Kemal gave a public speech in one of the most conservative Anatolian 
cities, where he wore a hat, claiming that “this is called a hat, it is what 
the civilized Europeans wear, and what the Turks who are going to 
join the ranks of civilized countries are to wear from then on.”30 A few 
revolts against the Western attire in general and the hat in particu-
lar—because its wide brim was especially detrimental to performing 
the Islamic ablutions—were summarily put down through a number 
of public hangings.
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It is interesting to note that no such regulations of attire were intro-
duced for women; instead, Mustafa Kemal educated them by example. 
All the women in his retinue were dressed in the latest European fash-
ion and wore no headscarves. Women were also immediately handed 
the right to vote and be elected, without a social struggle. They pro-
ceeded to join the workforce like their European counterparts in their 
desexualized business suits, their hair tightly bound in a chignon.31 I 
analyzed the dynamics of gender in the Middle East in general and 
Turkey in particular in the volume I edited, entitled Reconstructing Gen-
der in the Middle East: Tradition, Identity, Power. The volume analyzes the 
dynamics of the Turkish feminist movement that developed in such 
a state-centered manner.32 In all, the republican state employed these 
reforms to create a totally secular social structure legitimated by the 
modernity of the civilized West instead of the “traditional” Ottoman 
Muslim past, and manned by an urban secular citizen that professed 
loyalty to the Turkish nation.
Yet there was one significant flaw in this transformation through 
radical reforms: the reforms did not take hold throughout the society. 
They remained confined to urban centers and the newly burgeoning 
secular national middle class.33 The state also had to vigilantly guard 
the boundaries of secularism because every attempt to make the transi-
tion from the initial single-party system to a multi-party system ended 
up mobilizing the masses around the issue of Islamic religion. The first 
two attempts to found an opposition party occurred during Mustafa 
Kemal’s reign; in both cases, he handpicked some of his friends to form 
such parties against the Republican People’s Party (RPP), of which he 
was the founder and the leader.34 Even though his friends argued that 
such opposition parties could only take root in society if they did not 
run against the party of Mustafa Kemal, and suggested that he con-
sider stepping down as leader of the RPP to instead become the politi-
cally non-aligned president of the entire country, he chose to remain 
in political control. Ultimately, as the opposition parties drew a lot of 
popular support and the populace started to turn increasingly against 
the RPP, Mustafa Kemal had no choice but to shut down both parties.
VI. Transition to a Multi-Party System and the Cold War
The third and successful Turkish attempt to transition to a multi-party 
system occurred after the Second World War under the tutelage of 
Ismet Inonu, Mustafa Kemal’s trusted friend and fellow general, who 
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had succeeded him after 1938 primarily because he had the support of 
the military. Official Turkish historiography narrates this transition as 
Inonu deciding on his own that the time had come for RPP to educate 
the Turkish populace about acquiring a multi-party system, but I agree 
with scholars who point out the extraneous factor that forced Inonu’s 
hand: Turkey would not have been permitted to join NATO had it 
not undertaken such a transition.35 Yet this process, which occurred 
after 1948, proved to be a rather difficult one. Once again, during the 
national elections, religion emerged as the main social issue around 
which the opposition mobilized. The newly established Democrat 
Party (DP) won the elections by a landslide and started to undertake a 
series of changes that decreased the influence of the military. As there 
was not a strong leader like Mustafa Kemal to contain the increasing 
popularity of the Party and protect the privileges of the state bureau-
cracy, Democrat Party rule ended in 1960 with the first military coup in 
republican history. The opposition party was once again harshly sup-
pressed and a number of the DP leaders were tried and hanged.
The military intervention set a pattern that kept repeating itself 
approximately once every decade thereafter.36 The military ostensi-
bly intervened to preserve the republic. It abolished the government, 
changed the Constitution, tried and sentenced dissidents, punished 
party leaders or abolished the parties, then held elections, turned polit-
ical power over to the elected government, and left. They left every 
time because of Mustafa Kemal’s maxim that “the Turkish military 
should not get involved in politics and ultimately belongs in the bar-
racks.” Yet, ironically, it was another maxim of Kemal that legitimated 
their intervention each and every time, and this one stated that, “the 
military are the guardians of the Turkish republic.” Each time, the 
grounds for intervention was a religious threat since the military inter-
preted the political activities of a party with Islamist tendencies to be 
undermining the foundations of the republic. No one had the power to 
contest this interpretation.
It should be noted that Kemal had initially identified another social 
group, along with the military, as the guardians of the republic—the 
Turkish youth. But since they had no arms, they could never accumu-
late enough power to exercise their historical right and responsibility. 
Instead, most of the political activities of the Turkish youth were sanc-
tioned by the military and the government because of their leftist ten-
dencies. The major factor behind this sanction was the need to protect 
the existing political distribution of power, but an equally significant 
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one was the strategic alliance Turkey had chosen to form with the 
United States during the Cold War.37 Since Turkey had extensive bor-
ders with the Soviet Union, the U.S. government elected to form close 
political ties with Turkey in order to contain the Soviet Union. In the 
process, it advised Turkey to crack down on the domestic leftist move-
ments under the assumption that all of these were formed to bring 
about a revolution to establish communism. The flip side of this advice 
was the bolstering of rightist religious movements under the assump-
tion that such movements were not revolutionary but conservative, 
and therefore geared to sustain the status quo. Hence, the Turkish 
military suppressed and decimated leftist movements and leftist intel-
lectuals in the name of stamping out communism. It fostered instead 
culturally conservative religious movements.
The military had not been willing to accept the presence of Islamic 
religion in political life as it was defined, interpreted, and introduced 
by the populace. On the contrary, it formulated a nationalist civic 
version of Islam that was termed “the Turkish-Islamic synthesis.”38 
This version defined religion culturally, in terms of the practices the 
Turks themselves had introduced to Islam. Religion was to flourish 
only under the total control of the state rather than the community of 
believers. It is therefore not surprising that some retired generals were 
among the founding members of the predecessors of the Islamist party 
that is now in power. This occurred from the 1950s until the 1980s. 
With the decimation of the left and the nurturance instead of conser-
vative elements, the military had irretrievably tipped the balance of 
power in Turkish society in favor of the conservative groups. Soon it 
could not contain the increased political participation of the Islamists. 
So the military had to abandon advocating “the Turkish-Islamic syn-
thesis” and once again start to actively oppose the Islamists and take 
a very public political stand against them. They were aided in this 
endeavor by all the other Turkish political parties that had developed 
under state tutelage, since all had started to lose significant segments 
of their voters to these upstarts.
This veiled presence of the military in Turkish political life needs to 
be studied in further detail because the military is ironically regarded 
as the major force that preserves democracy, according to some secu-
lar segments of population, or that very much hinders it, according to 
other more religiously oriented segments. The military have always 
legitimated their intervention in political life on the grounds of the 
historical role the great leader Mustafa Kemal bequeathed upon them. 
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And they have always claimed their intervention to be “above politics” 
because they do not belong to any political party. They have also put 
forth the argument that their eventual departure from the political 
sphere after each military intervention demonstrates that their action 
was not based on their own interests but on the interests of the nation. 
They have further justified their frequent interventions on the grounds 
that it is the lack of trustworthy, responsible politicians that forces them 
to take such action. All of these arguments overlook how the frequent 
military interventions infantilize the Turkish politicians by enabling 
them to assume a political position without bestowing upon them the 
power to practice it and take responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions. In the meanwhile, the military keeps deciding what its 
annual budget ought to be without any checks or balances, and this 
undisclosed figure keeps being accepted by the Turkish Parliament 
without any discussion whatsoever. It should be noted here that it is 
estimated that the Turkish military receives about 65% of the annual 
budget (another 15% goes to paying back the IMF, which leaves the 
Turkish government about 20% on which to run the entire country).
VII. Economic and Social Liberalization after the 1980s
The last military intervention, which occurred in 1982, was different 
from the earlier ones on a number of levels. In an attempt to curb the 
“dangerous” ideologies that seem to keep infesting Turkish society, 
the military decided to systematically spread instead the one ideol-
ogy that kept legitimating their intervention: Kemalism. This official 
ideology penetrated every corner of the country as everything from 
roads to school buildings to parks became infused with images of 
Mustafa Kemal. Special institutions to study Kemalism were estab-
lished at many universities and prizes were given for the best works 
on the great leader. Yet all these activities failed to engage in a critical 
dialogue with what comprised Kemalism and how it could meet the 
evolving needs of Turkish society. Instead, they promoted state ideol-
ogy, upheld secularism, and suppressed any critical analysis.39
Another major difference of the 1982 military intervention was that 
the mixed economy (dominated by state monopolies and a state-pro-
tected domestic market) and the national bourgeoisie faced a serious 
crisis.40 The lack of market competition had bloated these monopo-
lies and slowed down the economy; the revenues of the military had 
likewise suffered. Strong economic measures had to be undertaken in 
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order to keep the country solvent. The military therefore permitted an 
economic liberalization policy that was started under the tutelage of a 
new conservative rightist political party, the Motherland Party (MP), 
led by Turgut Ozal.41 With this policy, Turkey was to leave behind 
state protection over the economy and let domestic industries face the 
challenges of the world markets. This liberalizing move was especially 
painful for the secular national bourgeoisie that had developed under 
the protective wings of the state, and that had supported the hege-
mony of the state and the military in the political sphere in return for 
profits in the economic sphere. Yet this bourgeoisie was particularly 
ill suited for such a move because they had initially been brought into 
existence by the Turkish state through the confiscation of the wealth 
and businesses of the departing minorities. They therefore lacked the 
initial skills to build and sustain businesses over the long term.
Although this economic liberalization was, and still is, painful, it 
nevertheless introduced two very significant new forces into Turk-
ish society. The first came about with the abolition of state control 
over communications, which bolstered civil society. The other was the 
opportunity to establish direct contact with global businesses without 
the mediation of the state, which produced a new social group of pro-
vincial Anatolian bourgeoisie.
As businesses needed to have direct access to information in order 
to compete in the world markets, the state monopoly over communica-
tions (radio, telephone, and television) was summarily abolished. In 
1984, within months, hundreds of radio and television stations, and 
later cellular phone companies, mushroomed throughout Turkey.42 
Access to information brought along hours-long chat shows on televi-
sion about social issues as the Turkish public saw and defined itself 
through the silver box. Radio stations transmitted messages of all sorts 
in all political colors, often discussing the particular dynamics of Turk-
ish society. As television cameras covered every corner of the country, 
especially in the 1990s, it was hard to prevent the surfacing of both the 
complicit behavior of the bourgeoisie, often in the form of white-collar 
crime, and the undercover intelligence activities of the military, often 
directed against its own populace and politicians. Hence, the state 
apparatus and its co-dependent bourgeoisie, now under increased 
scrutiny, appeared more and more corrupt and compromised.
The communications revolution and the opening up of world mar-
kets fueled the emergence of a new social group, a provincial bour-
geoisie that had been marginalized by the state and big businesses 
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for their relatively smaller size as well as their aspiration to define 
their identity through religious values. This bourgeoisie was religious 
but not traditional. As it had been socialized in the secular educa-
tional system of the Republic with the ideals of Western modernity, it 
ended up employing technology to its fullest. It therefore managed to 
develop what has since been called an “alternate modernity,” one that 
combines a religiously conservative self-definition with technologi-
cally cutting-edge business acumen.43 The accumulation of economic 
resources by this new social group, aptly named the “Anatolian Tigers” 
after the Southeast Asian economic powerhouses, ultimately enabled 
the political success of the Islamist Justice and Development Party 
(JDP) that is in power in Turkey today. Previous opposition parties in 
republican history had always been formed with state approval and 
had drawn extensively on the resources of the state; in return, they had 
never been able to refuse state tutelage in their political actions. Yet the 
economic liberalization of the 1980s produced a new bourgeoisie that 
could generate, for the first time, resources outside the control of the 
state. This bourgeoisie then invested these resources in a political party 
that developed in spite of fierce opposition from both the Turkish state 
and the military.44
VIII. Turkey’s Contested Location in the New World Order
The JDP and its intellectual predecessor, which was the Welfare Party 
(WP), advocated an economically liberal program that was targeted 
at both the religious and the secular segments of society.45 In addi-
tion, unlike the existing mainstream parties, it developed new political 
tactics to form an extensive voter base. The WP and later the JDP stud-
ied cutting-edge U.S. political campaign management skills. The JDP 
generated computer databases of voters, conducted opinion surveys 
every three months to pinpoint campaign issues, and actively recruited 
members.46 I personally remember how in 1990, when a Turkish col-
league and I conducted a survey of the Islamist movement in Turkey, 
we wanted to compare our results with those we assumed had been 
collected by the political parties. When we contacted the parties, we 
were surprised to find out that out of all of them, only the WP had 
conducted statistically rigorous surveys and could therefore provide 
comparative data for us.
Yet, in spite of this political mobilization and technological sophisti-
cation, the leaders of the JDP seemed painfully aware that the Party still 
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remained at the mercy of the military insofar as the latter controlled 
both the state apparatus as well as the republican narrative portraying 
the military as the guardians of Turkish democracy and secularism. In 
addition, the opening of Turkey to the world markets had revealed the 
urgency for Turkey to join an economic consortium within which to 
weather the exigencies of the world market. Since Turkey had aspired 
from its inception to be a part of Europe, it had applied for European 
Union (EU) membership very early, in 1963.47 The secular bourgeoisie 
wanted to join the EU because its economic interests in the world mar-
ket would be bolstered and protected within such a union. The Islamist 
bourgeoisie likewise saw the economic benefits from such a merger. In 
addition, they saw in the EU a political ally. As the EU promoted the 
exercise of democracy and human rights in all its member states, it 
would protect the right of the JDP to remain in Turkish political life 
against the threats of the military. These threats had become espe-
cially significant after the post-1982 formation of the National Security 
Council (NSC) by the military to further control Turkish political life. 
This council still functions at a level above the president, National 
Assembly, and the confines of the legal system. It was no accident that 
one of the first stipulations of the EU, in order for Turkey to qualify for 
membership, was the abolition of the NSC. The military was naturally 
opposed to this on grounds of national security.
This potential EU membership has generated a very interesting 
realignment in Turkish politics. For the first time since the inception 
of their relationship, the state bureaucracy, dominated by the military 
and the secular bourgeoisie it fostered, developed divergent interests. 
While the secular bourgeoisie realized that its interests lay with the 
EU, the state bureaucracy quickly became aware that any engagement 
with the EU would severely curb its power, both in terms of control 
over the economy (through the privatization of state monopolies) and 
the society (through the abolition of the NSC). And for the first time, 
the economic and political interests of the secular and Islamist bour-
geoisies became aligned. Both wanted EU membership and aspired 
to bring democratic practices and political stability to Turkey in order 
to accomplish it. It is this political standstill, with the military finding 
itself on the wrong side of the global equation in opposition to the 
secular bourgeoisie, which has enabled the current domestic political 
situation to persist without the political intervention of the military.
Even though the portrayal above depicts EU membership as the 
panacea to all of Turkey’s problems, there are still significant obstacles 
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to such a peaceful solution. The most significant obstacle lies within 
the structure of the EU. Because member countries are politically rep-
resented in the European Assembly according to population size, the 
very large Turkish population would guarantee it significant political 
clout at the outset. And the balance of power between the southern 
and northern countries of the EU, which is now dominated by the 
northern powers (England, France, Germany, Scandinavian countries) 
would shift to the advantage of the southern ones (Spain, Portugal, 
Italy). In addition, Turkey has to fulfill a significant number of domes-
tic reforms. It has to improve its human rights record, abolish trials for 
crimes of thought, enable the self-expression of ethnic and religious 
minorities such as the Kurds and Assyrians, and acknowledge the 
crimes committed against these and other minorities in history, espe-
cially against the Armenians and Greeks. The most significant obstacle 
to such a public acknowledgment of past and present crimes is the still 
strong Turkish nationalism that is constantly fostered by the Turkish 
military and the state bureaucracy that they have trained and social-
ized after their own image. Any thought or action that might chal-
lenge/criticize the Republic is still punishable by law.48
Also, Turks are constantly inundated with the nationalist rhetoric 
that the whole world is against them and they should therefore keep 
defending themselves and always expect the worst. It should be noted, 
however, that this nationalist instinct was recently undermined by a 
natural phenomenon, the devastating earthquake in 2000 that led to 
more than 30,000 deaths. As rescue efforts were immediately brought 
under scrutiny, two facts became very clear. First, the state bureau-
cracy was totally unprepared and ineffectual in mobilizing to help the 
victims.49 The military, in turn, employed its forces to first rescue and 
evacuate a military base instead of helping out the populace. Emerging 
triumphant were civil society organizations of students as well as non-
profit organizations, which quickly set up social support networks. 
The nationalist rhetoric that Turks have no friends in the world was 
proven thoroughly wrong as help poured in from all over. Still, these 
developments are relatively recent and have not been in place long 
enough to sustain democracy in Turkish society.
IX. Conclusion
I want to conclude with a discussion of the most significant factor hin-
dering the possibility of a robust democratic Turkey in the future: the 
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imagined presence of an East-West divide in general, and a religious-
secular divide in particular. Even though the East and West have had a 
long tradition of coexistence in Turkey, there are still very few people 
in the country who are willing to acknowledge this coexistence. The 
staunchly secular and Westernized military and their bourgeoisie still 
insist on defining Turkey solely as a modern, Westernized nation, one 
that has not, should not, and could not have an Islamic identity, which 
they see as traditional, backward, and uncivilized. For them, since the 
West and its modernity has been defined in Enlightenment terms as 
the ultimate triumph of science over religion, modernity over tradi-
tion, and secularism over Islam, being civilized means being European 
and therefore certainly not Islamic. As they have been socialized in an 
educational system formulated on the radically secular Jacobin model 
of secularism, Islam for them is the “Other” they do not know, an 
evil monster lurking within spidery cobwebs, one that could at any 
moment emerge to drag and topple Turkey into nothingness. Even 
though they unwillingly acknowledge that the Islamist government 
in Turkey has not, after one and a half years, brought about a religious 
revolution like that in Iran, they still believe it is cloaking its true inten-
tion of destroying the Turkish republic. Overcoming this deep mistrust 
of Islam is still extremely hard for the dominant secular state and its 
bourgeoisie. In the meanwhile, the Islamist bourgeoisie is constantly 
professing its loyalty to Turkish secularism in order to allay this fear. 
And they still have not generated enough knowledge or accumulated 
adequate experiences to define themselves on their own terms, for 
what they are rather than what the secular bourgeoisie claims them to 
be.
When Colin Powell, in an attempt to provide a positive model for 
Iraq and also to gently pave the way to pass the occupational torch to 
Muslim political allies of the United States, declared that, “what they 
aimed to accomplish in Iraq was an Islamist democracy like those in 
Turkey and Pakistan,” there was a major outcry in Turkey.50 “How 
dare Mr. Powell define us as a Muslim democracy?!”, decried the secu-
larists, pointing out that Turkey is a constitutionally secular modern 
democracy. And how could they be compared to Pakistan, when Tur-
key has always measured itself against the Western democracies? The 
Islamist government defended Mr. Powell’s statement by querying, 
“wasn’t it natural for him to refer to the democracy the Turks had 
established for themselves as a Muslim one since 99% of the people in 
Turkey were Muslims?”51
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This debate demonstrates the distance Turkey still needs to traverse 
before establishing a true democracy. Bridges need to be built between 
the liberal segments of both the secularist and Islamist bourgeoisies. 
Only then will it become clear that what makes countries like Turkey 
unique is the long coexistence of the East and West, rather than the 
East against the West. In the 21st century, no one can afford to hold 
onto or create such binaries. •
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